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1 introduction
This article analyses the current position of legal certainty (Rechtssicherheit)1 within the 
area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), and more specifically in EU criminal law. 
Legal certainty as a concept is ambiguous even in a national legal order, in relation to 
criminal law, but it is considered of utter importance, also within EU criminal law. How 
does legal certainty get expressed within the area of freedom, security and justice, and 
what does it consist of? These are the questions this article seeks to answer. 
The area of freedom, security and justice and its present status are analysed in this 
article, as is the concept of legal certainty within this area. EU criminal law is focused on, 
and the characteristics of it are analysed especially in relation to the nature of the Euro-
pean criminal justice system. This is done to exemplify legal certainty more specifically. 
Four examples from EU criminal law are chosen for this. These are firstly mutual recog-
nition in relation to human rights, which especially in relation to the European arrest 
warrants show possible lacunas, secondly minimum procedural rights, which the EU is 
currently focusing on, thirdly the position of the victim, which quite recently has been 
added to the EU criminal law field, and fourthly the possible European public prosecu-
tor’s office. These examples will show the diversity of EU criminal law and some of the 
1 See Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie (Studienausgabe, 2. Auflage C.F. Müller Verlag 2003) pp. 73-77 on Rechts-
sicherheit. In German, the term Rechtssicherheit is used, as is rättssäkerhet in Swedish. Legal certainty is 
perhaps not the best term for this, as it is used differently in different contexts and it is in this article not 
used in the sense of only res judicata (Rechtskraft, rättskraft), but in a broader meaning. See chapter 4 below 
for a definition and Paunio, Law, Language and Communication: Legal Certainty in Multilingual EU Law: 
Language, Discourse and Reasoning at the European Court of Justice (Ashgate Publishing Group, 2013) pp. 
54-60 on legal certainty and the rule of law.
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challenges this poses for legal certainty. Finally, some concluding remarks will be made 
to sum up the situation.
2 The current legal basis
The Lisbon Treaty stipulates the competences for EU criminal law.2 The introductory ar-
ticle 3(2) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) 3 states that ‘[t]he Union shall offer 
its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which 
the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with 
respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and com-
bating of crime’. Article 67(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU)4 continues by stating that ‘[t]he Union shall constitute an area of freedom, secu-
rity and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and 
traditions of the Member States’. Ensuring a high level of security through preventing and 
combatting crime is laid down as one of the main aims of the EU in article 67(3) TFEU.
The relevant provisions on EU criminal law are then found under chapter V, entitled 
area of freedom, security and justice. Article 82 TFEU regulates cooperation in criminal 
matters, article 83 TFEU regulates substantive criminal law and articles 85-86 regulate 
cooperation through Eurojust, and the possibility of a European Public Prosecutor’s Of-
fice. If we look at institutional cooperation firstly, Eurojust’s mission is to support and 
strengthen coordination and cooperation between national investigative and prosecution 
authorities (art. 85(1) TFEU). The initiation of a prosecution is however carried out by 
competent national authorities (art. 85(2) TFEU). Therefore, Eurojust’s competence does 
not have a supranational character as such. It builds on national competences.5
The competences on cooperation in criminal matters are based on the principle of 
mutual recognition. Realisation of this cornerstone includes harmonisation of relevant 
areas, such as establishing rules for union wide recognition of judicial decisions (art. 
82(1) TFEU). Furthermore can minimum rules be established, concerning evidence ad-
missibility, the rights of individuals in criminal procedure and the rights of victims of 
2 On the former third pillar and the competences, see Denza, The intergovernmental pillars of the European 
Union (Oxford University Press 2002), pp. 63–84. There are further rules on the legislative process and pos-
sibilities for Member States to oppose to instruments, but for the sake of this article, these are not focused 
on. For a more comprehensive analysis of these, see Herlin-Karnell, The Lisbon Treaty and the Area of 
Criminal Law and Justice, SIEPS European policy analysis 3/2008 pp. 6-7, available at http://www.sieps.se/
sites/default/files/421-20083epa.pdf (last visited 7.3.2014) and Herlin-Karnell, EU competence in criminal 
law after Lisbon, in Biondi et al. (eds.) EU law after Lisbon (Oxford University Press 2012) pp. 331-346. 
3 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326/13, 26.10.2012. 
4 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326/47. 26.10.2012. 
5 For more information on Eurojust, see Satzger, International and European criminal law (C.H. Beck, Hart, 
Nomos 2012) pp. 112-113 and Suominen, Eurojust, the past, the present and the future, 15 MJ 2 (2008) pp. 
217-234. 
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crime. This is to be done in the extent necessary for the realisation of mutual recognition 
and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension. 
(art. 82(2) TFEU).6 Harmonisation of substantive criminal law may be done in order to 
establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions. 
This applies in the areas of ‘particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension 
resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat 
them on a common basis’. These crimes are listed and are: terrorism, trafficking of human 
beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug and arms trafficking, 
corruption, money laundering, organised crime, counterfeiting of means of payment and 
computer crime (art. 83(1) TFEU). There is a further annex-competence which regulates 
harmonisation of criminal law that can be done for the effective implementation of a 
Union policy, in an area which is subject to harmonisation measures (art. 83(2) TFEU).7
3 The area of freedom, security and justice
The area of freedom, security and justice was launched at the Tampere conclusions and 
established with the Amsterdam Treaty.8 This area was created to ensure the free move-
ment of persons and to offer a high level of protection to European citizens. It covers 
policy areas from the management of the EU’s external borders to judicial cooperation 
in civil and criminal matters, and it also includes asylum and immigration policies and 
police cooperation.9 For the purpose of this article, criminal matters are focused on. The 
criminal law area entails a high level of security for its citizens through Member States 
cooperating in criminal matters. This security is considered of utmost importance for an 
efficient criminal justice system throughout the Union. The national criminal law sys-
tems of the Member States together form the area of freedom, security and justice, which 
then is to function as one system, where law enforcement, in a similar way as the perpe-
trator, is not prohibited by Member State borders. 
6 For more information on mutual recognition, see Kinzler, Das Prinzip gegenseitiger Anerkennung im eu-
ropäisierten Strafverfahren am Beispiel von Auslieferung und Beweismitteltransfer (Verlag Dr. Kovač 2010) 
and Suominen: The principle of mutual recognition in cooperation in criminal matters - A study of the princi-
ple in four framework decisions and in the implementation legislation in the Nordic Member States (Intersen-
tia, 2011). See also Gless and Vervaele, Law should govern: aspiring general principles for transnational 
criminal justice, Utrecht Law Review vol. 9, 4/2013 p. 3, where they note that mutual recognition applies a 
state-oriented approach where the individual’s interests are not adequately taken into account. See also Asp, 
Mutual recognition qua legal principle, in Festschrift für Helmut Fuchs (Verlag Österreich 2014) pp. 1-17. 
7 For more information on harmonisation, see Asp, The substantive criminal law competence of the EU (Stif-
telsen skrifter utgivna av juridiska fakulteten vid Stockholms Universitet 2012). 
8 Conclusions of the Tampere European Council 15–16 October 1999, 33–37 (available on www.europarl. 
europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm) and Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the 
Treaties establishing the European Communities and related acts, OJ C 340/1, 10.11.1997. 
9 The relevant articles are found under title V in the TFEU. 
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The goal, which can foremost be considered the area itself, is to be achieved by pre-
venting and combating crime. This is to be achieved through three different forms of 
cooperation. Mirroring the presentation on the competences in chapter 2 above, first-
ly, institutional cooperation, such as Eurojust increases cooperation between the rele-
vant institutions of the Member States and assists in relation to problems connected to 
cross-border crimes. Secondly, cooperation in procedural criminal law, usually expressed 
with the principle of mutual recognition, is itself dedicated to increasing effectiveness of 
cooperation between the Member States. The idea is that judgments and judicial deci-
sions move freely within the area of freedom, security and justice. Thirdly, harmonisation 
of substantive criminal law is essential for achieving an area of freedom, security and 
justice. There should not be too much diversity between the criminal laws of the Member 
States in relation to those crimes, of which a common focus is on. Some harmonisation 
is therefore necessary. These three forms of cooperation are together intended to prevent 
and combat crime and to securing that no perpetrator goes unpunished, only because he 
has crossed a border to another Member State.10  
The area of freedom, security and justice can to some extent be considered a reflection 
of the internal market of the EU.11 Applying ideas similar to those that apply within the 
internal market, especially for the principle of mutual recognition, to the area of crimi-
nal law was considered necessary due to the free movement of persons that the EU, and 
Schengen cooperation in particular enables. Within this area of freedom, security and 
justice, judicial decisions and judgments are to move freely and the idea is that recogni-
tion should prevail, regardless of whether the decision or judgment is a national one or 
one from another Member State. The area of freedom, security and justice is a European 
area where the effectiveness of cooperation is not to be hampered by actors belonging 
to different Member States. Due to the close connection between criminal law and state 
10 This is the current focus for example in the Commission, see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/crimi-
nal-law-policy (last visited 7.3.2014). On these three parts and their roles see Suominen, EU criminal law 
cooperation before and after the Lisbon Treaty - aspects and comments especially in relation to the Norwe-
gian position, JFT 6/2012 pp. 573-604. 
11 Similarly Nuotio, Eurooppalaisen integraation uusi painopiste: vapauden, turvallisuuden ja oikeuden Eu-
rooppa, in Vapauden, turvallisuuden ja oikeuden Eurooppa, eds. Nuotio and Malkki (Forum Iuris 2010) pp. 
1-3, also Klip European Criminal Law (2nd edition, Intersentia 2012) pp. 20-22.
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • 1/2014
5
sovereignty, deprivation of liberty and fundamental rights, the application of mutual rec-
ognition and enforcement in general has not been problem-free within this area.12
This area has been further developed over the last fifteen years to include more and 
more legal instruments. Effective crime combating can be considered its main goal, 
which is seen in the instruments agreed of within the area. These include instruments 
on serious crimes with a cross-border dimension such as terrorism and human traffick-
ing and crimes typically of an interest to protect for the EU such as financial crimes 
against the EU. Further instruments regulate cross-border cooperation such as mutual 
recognition of decisions on surrender (extradition), evidence gathering and execution of 
financial penalties.13 Effectiveness of cooperation, in all its forms, has become a leading 
ideal in EU criminal law. This applies especially in relation to institutional and procedural 
cooperation, as effectiveness in some way can be measured here and especially increased 
effectiveness is visible. This is in contrast to harmonisation of substantive law, where the 
increase of effectiveness and what it entails is more difficult to decipher.14 Simultaneously, 
harmonisation of substantive criminal law is important, if not crucial, for the functioning 
of an area of freedom, security and justice.
A component relevant for the area and particularly for cooperation is mutual trust 
between the Member States. This is inevitable for the area of freedom, security and jus-
tice. The Member States are considered to trust each other in terms of respecting human 
12 Especially the European Arrest Warrant, which is the most frequently applied mutual recognition instru-
ment in criminal law, has had its problems. See the judgments of the German constitutional court, BverfG 1 
BvL 14/76 (on the sentence of a life-long duration without a possibility of review and its contradiction with 
fundamental rights) and BverfG 2 BvR 2236/04 (on the surrender of own nationals and constitutionality of 
the EAW), the judgment from the Polish constitutional tribunal of 27.5.2005 in case P1/05 (on the surren-
der of own nationals and constitutionality of the EAW) and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Cyprus 
of 7.11.2005 in case 294/2005 (on the surrender of own nationals and the constitutionality of the EAW). See 
further Smith, Running before we can walk? Mutual recognition at the expense of fair trials in Europe’s area 
of freedom, security and justice. NJECL Vol. 4, 1-2/ 2013 pp. 82-98, Mitsilegas, The constitutional implica-
tions of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the EU. CMLRev 43:2006 p. 1281, Mitsilegas, The limits 
of mutual trust in Europe’s area of freedom, security and justice: from automatic inter-state cooperation 
to the slow emergence of the individual. Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2010 pp. 320-328, Klip 
2012 pp. 15-22. See also Asp 2012 pp. 76-78 on why criminal law is a special in relation to other areas of law. 
On the difference between mutual recognition in criminal law versus the internal market, see Janssens, The 
principle of mutual recognition in EU law (Oxford University Press 2013) and Suominen 2011 pp. 62-64.
13 As can be seen, the offences legislation concerns fall under the scope of art. 83 TFEU (and its predecessors). 
It is not possible here to include all relevant instruments. See Miettinen, Criminal law and policy in the 
European Union (Routledge 2013), Klip 2012 and Suominen 2012 pp. 587-590, 593-596 and 599-601 for an 
overview. 
14 See Herlin-Karnell, The constitutional dimension of European criminal law (Hart Publishing 2012) pp. 42-
61, Nicolaides and Geilmann, What is effective implementation of EU law? 19 MJ 3 (2012) pp. 383-399 and 
SOU 2003:74 Ökad effektivitet och rättssäkerhet i brottsbekämpning pp. 13-26 (official reports from the 
Swedish Government).  
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rights and applying national legislation according to these.15 This trust does not as such 
resolve any problems related to legal certainty, but with increasing legal certainty and 
imposing higher standards for procedural rights, the level of a common legal certainty 
can be improved. Increased knowledge will increase the level of mutual trust, and lifting 
up legal certainty problems can also have a positive development. 
The Commission has for instance in its communication on the area of freedom, secu-
rity and justice pointed out that the rights of the defence have to be strengthened to up-
hold mutual trust and the public confidence in the EU and that the common minimum 
guarantees should be extended.16 This is a good example of legal certainty matters being 
focused more within the area.17  
The area is often characterised by a tension between security on one hand and free-
dom and justice on the other. Security is prevailingly considered as crime combating 
and securing the European citizens against crime. Freedom and justice are prevailingly 
considered as protection of the individual and legal certainty.18 Effective crime-combat-
ting has seemingly been considered as the most important by the EU legislator, and most 
of the instruments on EU criminal law have an efficiency idea and crime combatting 
emphasis. Focus has therefore been on security issues whereas other aspects of the area, 
freedom and justice, have not been given as much legislative attention.19 Legal certainty 
is usually connected with justice, implying that the criminal justice system is just. This is 
however not always very clearly defined. We will therefore have a look at how legal cer-
tainty can be understood within the area of freedom, security and justice. 
4 Legal certainty
4.1 The national perspective
In a national setting, legal certainty is understood as entailing a state having legislation 
and a legal system that protects the individual against arbitrary measures from the state 
itself. Such measures include not being prosecuted or sentenced without sufficient evi-
15 On trust within the area of freedom, security and justice, see Mitsilegas 2010 pp. 319-372.  See further what 
is mentioned in chapter 6.2. below on mutual trust in mutual recognition cooperation. 
16 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, An area of freedom, 
security and justice serving the citizen, COM(2009) 262 final, 10.6.2009 at point 4.2.2.
17 See also the new Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European economic and social committee and the committee of regions, The EU Justice Agenda for 2020 
- Strengthening Trust, Mobility and Growth within the Union, COM(2014) 144 final, 11.3.2014, which 
emphasises trust. 
18 Similarly Thunberg-Schunke, Internationell rättslig hjälp i brottmål inom EU, effektivitet v. rättssäkerhet 
(Iustus förlag 2004) p. 264. See further Hudson, Who needs justice? Who need security? pp. 17-18 and 
Gröning, Security, justice and the criminal justice system: remarks on EU criminal law pp. 136-139, both 
in Justice and Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hudson, Ugelvik (Routledge 2012). 
19 Asp 2012 p. 73. 
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dence, not being sentenced without legal support and that all individuals are considered 
and treated equally regardless of their social status or origin. Furthermore is legal certain-
ty considered including legal rules being applied efficiently and predictably, and these are 
associated with a democratic state subscribing to the rule of law. Legal certainty can be 
divided into formal and substantive forms. Formal legal certainty is the traditional legal 
certainty where fairness resulting from predictability is considered important. Punish-
ment, coercive measures, prosecution and sentencing of criminals should be predictable 
and be applied uniformly and in a systematic order. This entails that criminal law cannot 
be applied retroactively. Substantive legal certainty includes that judicial practice is ethi-
cally and morally good.20 
Legal certainty can be considered denoting res judicata, the legal force of judgments 
and judicial decisions, meaning the finality of the decision when there is no possibility to 
appeal it. This is however not what is the subject of study here. In relation to the area of 
freedom, security and justice, legal certainty can be considered encompassing more than 
the legal force of judicial decisions and consisting of more aspects than res judicata.21 
4.2 The ECHR
Certain rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)22 can 
be considered exemplifying legal certainty. Articles 5, 6 and 7 and in some respects 8, as 
well as article 4 of protocol 7 are all relevant to legal certainty in a European perspective. 
The right to liberty and security is included in legal certainty. As article 5 ECHR states, 
no one is to be deprived of his liberty unless in certain specified cases and as prescribed 
by law. Such cases include situations of lawful detention after a conviction, lawful arrest 
or detention for not complying with a lawful order, or lawful arrest or detention with the 
purpose of bringing the person before a competent legal authority based on reasonable 
suspicion.23 The right to a fair trial prescribed in article 6 ECHR is included in legal 
certainty and comprises the right to a fair, public hearing within a reasonable time and 
before an independent and impartial court established by law. The individual is to be pre-
sumed innocent until proven guilty and he should be granted certain minimum rights, 
such as being informed in detail and in a language he understands of the nature and cause 
of the accusation, enough time to prepare his defence, and a possibility to defend himself, 
20 See Peczenik, On law and reason (Springer 2009) p. 24-27, also Ehrenkrona, Rättssäkerhetsbegreppet och 
Europakonventionen, SvJT 2007 pp. 38-49. 
21 See further Trechsel, Human rights in criminal proceedings (Oxford University Press 2005) p. 115. 
22 The European Convention on Human Rights, Rome 4 November 1950. 
23 See Trechsel 2005 pp. 405 ff, especially chapters 18 and 19 for a detailed presentation of these rights. 
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possibly through legal assistance, the right to examine and have witnesses examined on 
his behalf as well as the possibility to have an interpreter, if necessary.24 
The legality principle nulla poena sina lege is naturally included in legal certainty. 
Pursuant to article 7 ECHR, no one shall be found guilty of an offence or omission that 
did not constitute an offence under national or international law at the time committed. 
The legality principle is relevant in many connections with legal certainty, and these two 
concepts can be considered somewhat intertwined. In addition to res judicata, the legality 
principle is one of the most typical aspects of legal certainty, which is often analysed and 
considered expressing legal certainty. In this article, the legality principle is considered 
part of legal certainty, but only constituting one part of it.25 The ne bis in idem principle 
enshrined in article 4 of protocol nr. 7 is furthermore a part of legal certainty. This prin-
ciple entails that a person can be tried and punished only once for the same criminal 
offence.26 The right of private life in article 8 ECHR can furthermore be included in the 
concept of legal certainty. This right entails everyone’s right to private and family life, un-
less otherwise prescribed by law and deemed necessary in a democratic society. 
4.3 EU law and EU criminal law
In EU law generally, legal certainty is usually associated with protection of legitimate ex-
pectations, which is often connected to enforcement and effectiveness of EU law.27 Legal 
certainty is a general principle of EU law and is considered to include several sub-prin-
ciples.28 These include full enforcement of Union law, unity and coherence of the Union 
legal order, procedural exclusivity and non-retroactivity in relation to legitimate expecta-
tions as well as acquired rights, legitimate expectations and res judicata.29 The prohibition 
of retroactivity is in respect to criminal law absolute.30 Law, and also EU law requires a 
24 See Trechsel 2005 pp. 45 ff, especially chapters 3 to 6 on the right to a fair trial, also Gless, Transnational 
cooperation in criminal matters and the guarantee of a fair trial: approaches to a general principle, Utrecht 
Law Review, vol. 9, 4/2013 pp. 91-101 especially on equality of arms in a EU setting. 
25 Unfortunately this paper does not allow for further deliberations on the legality principle, but see Murphy, 
The Principle of Legality in Criminal Law under the ECHR, European Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 
2, 2010 pp. 192-210, on the legality principle in EU law Besselink et al. (eds.) The eclipse on the legality 
principle in the European Union (Wolters Kluwer 2011), Asp 2012 pp. 168-178 and in national criminal 
law Frände, Den straffrättsliga legalitetsprincipen (Juridiska föreningens i Finland publikationsserie N:o 52 
1989). 
26 See Trechsel 2005 pp. 382-402 as well as Rui, Forbudet mot gjentatt straffeforfølgning (ne bis in idem) (Uni-
versitetsforlaget 2009). 
27 Paunio 2013 pp. 68 ff. and already in 1995 connected to the effectiveness, Ward: Effective sanctions in EC 
law: a moving boundary in the division of competence, European Law Journal, Vol. 1, 2/1995 pp. 214-215. 
28 See CJEU joined cases C-42/59 and C-49/59 SNUPAT v High Authority, case C-63/93 Duff, C-107/97 Max 
Rombi and C-126/97 Eco Swiss as well as C-224/01 Köbler, C-318/10 SIAT and C-284/11 EMS-Bulgaria 
Transport OOD. 
29 Paunio 2013 p. 65 and Tridimas, The general principles of EU law (2nd edition, Oxford 2006) pp. 242 ff.
30 Tridimas 2006 p. 253. 
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certain degree of predictability, so that the actors can foresee the legal consequences of 
their actions.31 Legal certainty can be divided into formal and material legal certainty, 
which denote predictability and acceptability.32 Legal certainty has been considered to 
apply ‘as a directly applicable principle used in judicial decision-making as well as an 
interpretive principle influencing decision-making at the Court’.33 
In EU criminal law, legal certainty is usually connected to the legality principle. Legal 
certainty could encompass only the legality principle, but within the area of freedom, se-
curity and justice it seems to be a broader concept of which the legality principle is a part, 
and legal certainty and the legality principle are intrinsically linked.34 From the case law 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in criminal cases, legal certainty is 
used as a term covering procedural rights in European cooperation situations,35 and here 
ne bis in idem is relevant,36 or the fact that the legal certainty motivates using the urgent 
procedure (PPU).37 Moreover, legal certainty is used in relation to the prohibition of con-
tra legem interpretation,38 conform interpretation of EU law39 or the legality principle.40
In relation to general principles of transnational criminal law, Gless has considered 
legal certainty comprising the principle of legality, the principle of personal guilt as a 
prerequisite for criminal responsibility, fair trial rights and procedural safeguards, an in-
ternationalised ne bis in idem principle and judicial control of transnational law enforce-
ment and criminal prosecution. She continues, stating that legal certainty ‘forms part of 
all the national legal European systems as well as the case law of the European court of 
31 Paunio 2013 p. 51. 
32 Paunio 2013 p. 52 including references. 
33 Paunio 2013 p. 64, see furthermore pp. 64-99 for a comprehensive analysis. 
34 CJEU cases C-201/88 Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG para. 36, joined cases C-74/95 and C-129/95, Criminal 
proceedings against X para. 25 and Klip 2012  pp. 179-190 on the legality principle. 
35 Cases C-192/12 West PPU, C-296/08 PPU Santesteban Coicoechea, C-105/03 Pupino, T-348/07 Al-Aq-
sa, opinions of advocate general in cases C-399/11 Melloni, C-297/07 Bourquain, C-467/05 Dell’Orto, 
C-354/04 P Gestoras pro amnistia and others. 
36 Cases C-228/05 Kretzinger, C-150/05 van Straaten, and opinions of advocate general in cases C-261/09 
Mantello, C-463/04 van Esbroek and joined cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 Gözütok and Brügge. 
37 Case C-192/12 PPU West. The urgent preliminary ruling is an expedited procedure for references for a 
preliminary ruling relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, see art. 23a of the Protocol (no 3) 
on the statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, OJ C 83/210, 30.3.2010. 
38 Opinion of the general advocate in case C-79/11 Maurizio Giovanardi and others. 
39 Case C-188/10 Melki. 
40 Cases C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld, joined cases C-74/95 and C-129/95 criminal proceedings 
against x, C-384/02 Grøngaard and Bang, opinion of advocate general in case C-457/02 Antonio Niselli. It 
is interesting further to notice that the CJEU applies the term legal certainty in these cases, and does not 
seem to distinguish further between different terminological aspects.
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human rights and the European Union body of law’.41 As the EU does not have compe-
tence in relation to the general part of criminal law (such as defining the guilt principle, 
although it can, in its instruments, regulate that intent is to be criminalised, it is up to 
the Member States to further regulate how this is defined), the principle of personal guilt 
cannot be considered part of legal certainty as such in the context of the area of freedom, 
security and justice, although this is naturally present in the Member States legal orders.42 
Gless’s definition is otherwise well-suited for the area. 
4.4 A working definition
Gless’s definition of legal certainty is applied in this article, but without the principle of 
personal guilt. Legal certainty, within the area of freedom, security and justice, is there-
fore in the context of this article to be construed of the principle of legality, safeguarding 
procedural rights connected to the requirement of a fair trial, including victims’ rights. 
Furthermore are the ne bis in idem principle and judicial control of transnational law 
enforcement and criminal prosecution considered part of this concept. Although there is 
today no European court with a punitive competence (to rule on criminal law responsi-
bility), the actors in the cooperation in criminal matters are the authorities of the Mem-
ber States, which are subjected to national judicial review. The general competence of 
the CJEU is relevant as far as preliminary rulings are concerned; all national courts can 
and courts of last resort (national Supreme Courts) shall request a preliminary ruling, if 
necessary for the judgment.43 
All these parts of legal certainty are found in the constitutional traditions of the Mem-
ber States, the ECHR, EU instruments, such as the Charter of fundamental rights of the 
EU (CFREU)44 and other relevant documents, in addition to the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and CJEU.45 
41 Gless, General principles of transnational criminal law - a European perspective on the principle of legal 
certainty. A paper presented at the Globalization of crime: criminal justice responses conference August 
7-11, 2011 Ottawa, Canada p. 2, quote p. 4. Paper available at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/files/2012/july/ 
Sabine%20 Gless %20Principles%20Transnational%20Law.pdf (Gless 2011a) See further Gless, A new test 
for mens rea? Safeguarding legal certainty in a European area of freedom, security and justice, EuCLR vol 
1, 2011/2 pp. 114-122 (Gless 2011b), where she applies a slightly more restricted concept, which seems to 
resemble the legality principle. 
42 For more information see Blomsma, Mens rea and defences in European criminal law (Intersentia 2012). 
43 Articles 267 TFEU and 258-260 TFEU. There is a possibility pursuant to article 257 TFEU to establish 
specialised courts. It is possible to establish a specialised criminal court, but such a court would not have a 
punitive competence of its own, as this competence lies at the national level.
44 Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, OJ C 326/391, 26.10.2012. 
45 See correspondingly the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014) 158 final, 11.3.2014, which will 
be briefly dealt with in chapter 7. 
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5 The ‘system’ of an area of freedom, security  
and justice and its focus on legal certainty
5.1 Introduction
To begin with, it can be noted that several Member States have breached legal certainty 
as defined in the ECtHR, showing that adding the EU into the cooperation is not the 
only problematic aspect. Examples of such breaches are different violations of the right 
to a fair trial, which include the lack of opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, which 
had not effectively been counterbalanced in the proceedings, the fairness and length of 
the trial, the legality principle in relation to applying the more lenient criminal law, the 
procedure prescribed by law relating to deprivation of liberty and refusal of access to 
documents in case file material relating to lawfulness of detention.46 
5.2 A European criminal justice ‘system’?
The criminal justice ‘system’ of the EU is different, as a legal system, when compared to 
the national criminal justice systems. The area of freedom, security and justice is an area 
comprising the Member States, where different criminal law systems coexist. These crim-
inal justice systems are different and diverse priorities and understandings arise. This is 
especially true in relation to legal certainty. The area of freedom, security and justice does 
not as such unify the national legislations in it. Cooperation and harmonisation are fo-
cused on within this area. There is however not only one system of criminal and criminal 
procedural law, in the sense we usually tend to understand a criminal law system.47 
EU criminal law usually focuses on effective crime combatting within the EU and is 
often criticised for its focus on effectiveness and repressive measures of criminal law.48 
Although it seems difficult to say why there is a (over-) reliance on criminal law as an ef-
fective means to regulate unwanted behaviour, most such reliance seems to exist without 
much basis in empirical studies.49 At the same time, focus on effectiveness in EU criminal 
law can lead to the decrease of focus on legal certainty aspects. One can think of legisla-
46 See on art. 6 e.g. Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK appl. nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06 (2011), Zielinski and 
Pradal and Gonzales and others v. France appl. nos. 24846/94 and 34165/96 to 34173/96 (2009), on art. 7, 
Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2) appl. no. 10249/03 (2009), and on art. 5, Medvedyev and others v. France appl. no. 
3394/03 (2010) and Mooren v. Germany appl. no. 11364/03 (2009).
47 Another question is naturally if there even is such a need at all. This question cannot be further elaborated 
on in this context. 
48 Similarly Wieczorek, A needed balance between security, liberty and justice. Positive signals arrive from 
the field of victims’ rights, EuCLR vo. 2, 2012/2 p. 142. See also Asp 2012 pp. 71-73. 
49 Elholm, Does the EU cooperation necessarily mean increased repression in the Nordic countries? Euro-
pean Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 17, 3/2009 pp. 220 and 222 and de Bondt, 
Evidence Based EU Criminal Policy Making: In Search of Matching Data, European Journal on Criminal 
Policy and Research vol. 1, 1/2014 pp. 23-49.  
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tive initiatives where new forms for cooperation are invented, but not taking into account 
the possible problems and lacunas for the suspected or accused person at the same time, 
or raising the level of minimum penalties very high, in an area which is not necessarily 
problematic in all Member States and therefore creating an imbalance in the national 
systems. Having effectiveness as a main focus does not automatically lead to less legal cer-
tainty, but one should have the complete criminal justice system in mind when legislating 
and issuing new measures.50 Although the area of freedom, security and justice is not, as 
such, a criminal justice system, it tries to adhere to one in relation to mutual recognition, 
other measures striving for free movement of judicial decisions and judgments and in 
relation to harmonisation of substantive criminal laws.51 
The question is perhaps whether the EU should, and can strive for a similar balanced 
system, as the national criminal law ones. If this is the objective, focus should be more 
on a comprehensive approach than on the ad hoc approach that perhaps characterises 
today’s EU criminal law. The legal instruments enacted represent somewhat a patchwork 
of instruments, where problems hindering effective cooperation are focused on, but not 
in a very systematic or coherent way. EU measures on criminal law centre on effective 
crime combatting, and police-, prosecutor- and court-cooperation is made more effec-
tive without giving the same attention to defence rights or other individual rights, which 
exemplify legal certainty. 
5.3 Current focus on legal certainty
Of course this is not to say that legal certainty is not given any attention at all. Some 
measures to safeguard legal certainty have been implemented, such as the charter on 
fundamental rights, the roadmap for minimum procedural rights and the Stockholm 
programme.52 
The charter confirms the human rights position of the EU, and is not intended to fur-
ther amend the Member States’ obligations as prescribed under the ECHR, nor to extend 
the competences of the EU.53 The charter applies when the Member States act within the 
scope of application of EU law. This has been considered encompassing implementing, 
50 See Asp et al. A Manifesto on European Criminal Policy, ZIS (Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdog-
matik – www.zis-online.com) 12/2009 pp. 707-716. 
51 See further Klip 2012 pp. 469-484, especially pp. 479-481 and Gröning, A Criminal Justice System or a Sys-
tem Deficit? Notes on the System Structure of the EU Criminal Law, European Journal of Crime, Criminal 
Law and Criminal Justice 18 2/2010 pp. 115–137.
52 Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of 
suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings, OJ 2009/C 295/01 and The Stockholm programme 
-  an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, OJ 2010/C 115/1. 
53 Gless 2013 p. 92 and for more information see Franklin, The Legal Status of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon, 15 (2011) 2 Tilburg Law Review pp. 137-162. 
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enforcing or interpreting EU legislation at the national level.54 The charter confirms the 
rights of individuals in the EU, based on the ECHR, the case law of the CJEU and other 
relevant principles or rights from EU law. The provisions regulating justice matters in the 
charter are naturally relevant for legal certainty. These are the provisions entailing the 
right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (art. 47), the presumption of innocence (art. 
48), the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties (art. 
49) and the ne bis in idem principle (art. 50). The protection of human rights in the event 
of removal, expulsion or extradition (art. 19(2)) can further be considered relevant. These 
rights are mainly postulated as they are found in the ECHR and in the ECtHR case law, 
and the proportionality of penalties is based on the common constitutional traditions of 
the Member States and the case law of the CJEU.55 
The roadmap includes six different measures which are to be focused on. These are 
translation and interpretation, information on rights and charges, legal advice and legal 
aid, communication with relatives, employees and consular authorities, special safeguards 
for vulnerable suspected or accused persons and the green paper on pre-trial detention. 
For the two first measures, there are directives adopted and there is a proposal for a direc-
tive on the access to a lawyer and a green paper on pre-trial detention.56 The step-by-step 
approach chosen for legislating on each different measure, in an instrument on its own is 
based on the reluctance of the Member States to agree on a previous proposal on a frame-
work decision on certain procedural rights.57 Although perhaps systematically it might 
be preferable to include such rights in one instrument, this was not possible and has led 
to this patchwork of procedural rights legislation within the EU today. The roadmap will 
be analysed in more detail under chapter 6.3. 
The Stockholm programme, an agenda setting out the priorities of the EU for the 
area of freedom, security and justice for 2010-2014 emphasises the importance of the 
54 Franklin 2011 pp. 152-153. 
55 On proportionality and penalties in relation to the ECHR, see Aall, Prosessuelle garantier og forholdsmes-
sighet i straffeprosessen. Jussens Venner vol. 48, 4/2013 pp. 253-256.  
56 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right 
to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, OJ 2010/L 280/1, Directive 2012/13/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceed-
ings, OJ 2012/L 142/1, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right 
of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to communicate upon arrest, COM(2011) 
326 final (latest resolution by the EP 10.09.2013) and Green paper on strengthening mutual trust in the 
European judicial area – A Green Paper on the application of EU criminal justice legislation in the field of 
detention, COM(2011) 327 final. On the replies to the Green paper, see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news-
room/criminal/opinion/110614_en.htm (last visited 25.2.2014). 
57 Proposal for a Council framework decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings through-
out the European Union, 28.4.2004 COM(2004) 328 final presented by the Commission. The reluctance 
may of course have been motivated by the lack of a legislative ground for the proposal under then current 
Treaties. 
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roadmap.58 The programme includes aspects such as increasing access to justice, further 
developed cooperation in criminal matters between the Member States, more harmon-
isation and increasing of mutual trust. Procedural minimum rights, relevant for legal 
certainty, are also mentioned, but the Stockholm programme does not explicitly refer to 
legal certainty further.59  A need for EU measures emphasising legal certainty is therefore 
present within the area of freedom, security and justice. This has evidently been noted 
by the EU, as it has taken many relevant initiatives, and legal certainty is in focus today. 
Some studies have shown that legal certainty, especially safeguarding the suspected or 
accused persons’ rights, is not always easy to ensure in a European setting. This is natural-
ly problematic, if the nature of the procedure, being European, leads to legal certainty not 
being properly realised. In some cases this depends, in addition to the effectiveness of the 
prosecutorial side, on the defence not being familiar enough with the (national) remedies 
and rights available in cross-border proceedings.60 This is hugely problematic and shows 
that application of EU criminal law needs to focus more closely on these aspects. That the 
criminal proceedings crosses borders should not lead to legal certainty being weakened. 
Further measures and training on defence rights and rights of the individual are neces-
sary for a balanced criminal justice system. The Stockholm programme mentioned train-
ing of legal professionals, but unfortunately does not mention defence in this respect.61 
5.4 Lastly
A last question can be raised in this context. Is if the EU the right actor in relation to legal 
certainty? Worth noting is that neither the ECHR nor the CFREU regulate cross-border 
situations, but state-internal rights.62 A possibility would be that the Member States are 
responsible for the developments and safeguarding of legal certainty. These are after all 
the primary actors within the area of freedom, security and justice, since police, prose-
cutors, judges, courts and correctional services etc. are national. Having in mind that the 
EU enables and, more importantly, demands Member States to harmonise criminal law 
and to cooperate more effectively, it seems logical that the EU should focus also on legal 
certainty aspects.  If a lacuna, such as a suspected or accused person not being able to use 
all national safeguards in a European procedure, results directly from EU instruments 
making cooperation more effective, it is imperative that the EU takes responsibility and 
58 The programme covers the whole area of freedom, security and justice, but only the criminal law aspects 
are focused on here.
59 For more information on the Stockholm programme and its implementation, see the Presidency note on the 
Stockholm Programme mid-term review, 15921/12, 13.11. 2012. 
60 Fair trials international, Defence rights in the EU, 2012 p. 46-52. 
61 Stockholm programme p. 6.
62 See Gless 2013 pp. 93 ff. However, as ECtHR case law indicates, this is not completely clear cut, see Soer-
ing v. The United Kingdom, appl. no. 140388/88, 7.7.1989 para. 113 and Stojkovic v. France and Belgium, 
appl. no. 25303/08, 27.10.2011 paras. 51-57. 
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repairs the situation.63 In terms of a balanced and rational criminal justice system, the 
EU should make sure such gaps do not occur. Enacting legislation for the detriment of 
the suspected or accused person and not focusing on the overall balance will affect legal 
certainty. This has previously been noted by Fair trial international, which demand more 
effectiveness in relation to procedural rights within the EU and point out that these need 
to be prioritised.64 
6 Examples from EU criminal law 
6.1 Introduction
As mentioned above, the area of freedom, security and justice is construed of many dif-
ferent parts and is somewhat difficult to grasp in a more concise and coherent way. For 
illustrating more concretely the position of legal certainty within the area of freedom, 
security and justice today, four examples from EU criminal law are presented here. It 
is very difficult to cover the whole aspect of criminal law within the area of freedom, 
security and justice. The four examples are chosen due to their actuality today and as 
they represent different parts of EU criminal law and grasp the width of relevant legal 
certainty questions. 
Mutual recognition as the cornerstone of cooperation in criminal matters opens up 
many possible detriments for the suspected or accused. The most important ones, namely 
human rights grounds for refusal, are analysed here from a legal certainty point of view. 
Minimum procedural rights are a given example in respect to legal certainty, as these 
embody the core of it. The rights of the victims are perhaps not as given, but taken into 
account the possibilities of overlapping jurisdictions, cooperation in criminal matters 
and diversities in the Member States’ legislation on the rights of victims, these are also an 
important part of legal certainty today. Lastly, the proposal for the EPPO is looked upon 
to exemplify the possible problems of legal certainty, when focus is so heavily on effec-
tiveness of prosecution. With these four examples of different aspects currently focused 
on within the EU, the complexity of a concept such as legal certainty within the area of 
freedom, security and justice is demonstrated. 
6.2 Mutual recognition and human rights 
Mutual recognition is one of the main principles within the area of freedom, security 
and justice. Applying this principle has its main focus on effectiveness and recognition 
of foreign judicial decisions as national ones, which again impacts legal certainty. There 
63 Thunberg-Shunke, En kodifiering av tillräckliga rättssäkerhetsgarantier för misstänkta och tilltalade - krav 
för ett fortsatt samarbete i brottmål inom EU? In Festskrift för Suzanne Wennberg (Nordstedts Juridik 
2009) pp. 373-381 demanded (already in 2009) modern solutions for the current problems within the EU. 
64 Defence rights in the EU, 2012 p. 41. 
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are several different aspects that could be analysed here, as effectiveness can pose several 
problems for legal certainty, but only three are focused on here.   
Firstly, being the cornerstone for cooperation in criminal matters, the idea from the 
EU‘s perspective is that cooperation should be as efficient as possible and that judicial 
decisions should be recognised as far as possible. There are certain grounds for refusal in 
the instruments, which regulate situations where recognition should or may be refused, 
such as if the matter has already been solved in the executing state (ne bis in idem), or if 
the person sought is under the age of criminal responsibility in the executing state. There 
are however no grounds for refusal based on human rights concerns. This means that if 
the execution of a judicial decision would contravene with human rights, the instruments 
do not as such have a ground for refusal for this. This is based on the presumption that all 
Member States are considered to protect these rights sufficiently. No human rights issues 
should exist, where recognition can or may be refused between the Member States.65 This 
is expressed in the recitals and introductory articles of the instruments, where it is stated 
that the instruments respect human rights and that nothing in the instrument is to be 
considered amending the Member States’ obligation to respect fundamental rights. These 
are however not grounds for refusal, but mainly declamatory statements. 
The common respect of human rights in addition to a mutual trust between the Mem-
ber States lead to no need for such grounds for refusal. The Member States are considered 
to trust each other in terms of respecting human rights, and this applies also for applying 
all national legislation according to common European human rights standards. No in-
struments applying mutual recognition in the different forms of cooperation therefore 
have human rights grounds for refusal.66 The newly adopted European investigation order 
is an exception to this, and is a positive development as regards human rights grounds for 
65 Further on these, see Suominen 2011 pp. 197-205. 
66 Framework decisions today in addition to the EAW concern confiscation orders, financial penal-
ties, freezing orders, evidence, taking convictions into account, custodial sentences, suspended and 
alternative sentencing and the European supervision order. These are the Council framework deci-
sion of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Mem-
ber States, OJ/2002 L 190/1, as amended by the Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 
26 February 2009 amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 
2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons and foster-
ing the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the 
person concerned at the trial, OJ L 81/24, 27.3.2009, Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA 
of 6 October 2006 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders, 
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refusal.67 The CJEU has in its case law on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) concluded 
that Member States can only refuse cooperation based on a mutual recognition instru-
ment when there is a ground for refusal found in the EU instrument.68 Therefore, if there 
is concern in relation to human rights, the recognition should not be refused, if there is 
no such possibility according to the instrument. 
Although the EU considers such grounds for refusal unnecessary, several Member 
States have included human rights as grounds for refusal in their national implement-
ing legislation, as previous studies have shown.69 In addition to this, there are several 
cases where Member States have been found breaching different human rights under 
the ECHR by the ECtHR. The presumption that human rights are always respected and 
that cooperation can be based on this presumption has come close to being rebuttable.70 
This does not lessen the fact that the instruments should already at the EU level include 
a possibility to refuse recognition in case of human rights concerns. 
This means that legal certainty within the area of freedom, security and justice is not 
as highly protected when it comes to human rights aspects in mutual recognition cooper-
ation, as it should be. Although the Member States take their responsibility and several of 
 OJ L 328/59, 24/11/2006, Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the applica-
tion of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties, OJ L 76/16, 22/03/2005, Council frame-
work decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the European Union of orders freezing 
property or evidence, OJ L196/45, 2.8.2003, Council framework decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 
2008 on the European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use 
in proceedings in criminal matters, OJ L 350/72, 30.12.2008, Council framework decision 2008/675/JHA 
of 24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the course 
of new criminal proceeding and custodial sentences, OJ L 220/32, 15.8.2008, Council framework decision 
2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judg-
ments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for 
the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, OJ L 327/27, 5.12.2008 and Council Framework 
Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to 
judgments and probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and alternative 
sanctions, OJ L 337/201, 16/12/2008 and Council framework decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 
on the application, between Member States of the European Union, of the principle of mutual recognition 
to decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention, OJ L 294/20, 11.11.2009).  
67 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the European Investigation Order in 
criminal matters Brussels, of 7.3.2014, PE-CONS 122/13. Its art. 11f) states that the recognition and ex-
ecution of an EIO may be refused if ‘there are substantial grounds to believe that the execution of the 
investigative measure indicated in the EIO would be incompatible with the executing State’s obligations in 
accordance with Article 6 TEU and the Charter’. 
68 CJEU case C-388/08 PPU Leymann and Pustovarov para. 51, also cases C-261/09 Mantello para. 37 and 
C-396/11 Radu, para. 43 (although in this particular case it is not hard to agree with the CJEU) and 
C-399/11 Melloni para. 63. 
69 Suominen 2011 pp. 197-200 and 205-222. 
70 See further Suominen, Grundläggande rättigheter i straffrättsligt samarbete, JFT 1-2/2014 pp. 44-51 also 
on such case law. 
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these have inserted such grounds for refusal, the situation is not optimal.71 This is a rather 
serious deficit in the European cooperation in criminal matters. Hopefully this deficit 
will be given more attention also in the light of the new instruments on mutual recogni-
tion, and also those regulating minimum procedural rights (see chapter 6.3). 
Secondly, there are some discrepancies in the current arrest warrant system. In some 
situations a person can be subjected to the same arrest warrant several times, although 
the recognition of the arrest warrant has already been refused. If the recognition is re-
fused based on a legitimate ground for refusal, this refusal is not recognised within the 
area of freedom, security and justice. As the arrest warrant is sometimes left in the Schen-
gen Information System (SIS or SIS II),72 the person, when travelling to another Member 
State, can be apprehended based on the same arrest warrant and subjected to the same 
procedure, as he already has been, where a ground for refusal was applied and recog-
nition refused. This connects to a larger discussion on a European dimension of legal 
force.73 Without going further into this, it can be noted that in some cases, the refusal 
not having a European legal force can be motivated. This applies for refusals based on 
national aspects, such as ongoing prosecution of the same person for other offences in the 
executing state. In situations where the refusal is based on an aspect having a European 
dimension, such as ne bis in idem or human rights as argued above, the refusal having no 
effect within the area of freedom, security and justice seems illogical. 
The fact that a person within this area can be subjected several times to the same ar-
rest warrant, which has already been refused, does not seem promising for legal certainty 
nor effectiveness. If a refusal is based on a ground having relevance within the whole 
area, there should at least be some form of recognition of such a refusal. When the EU 
legislator has legislated instruments for effective cooperation, it should make sure that 
no loopholes or problematic situations occur when applying those instruments. Making 
it possible for Member States to issue or keep the arrest warrant in the information sys-
tem, when the recognition has been refused should be addressed, or should at least be 
acknowledged as a practical problem for the individual, which may hamper his right of 
free movement within the EU. 
This links to the third aspect where mutual recognition affects legal certainty. When 
focus lies heavily on the effective cooperation, this sometimes has a detrimental effect on 
the suspected or accused person. In several cases a more lenient measure could be used, 
but such measures do not yet exist at the EU level, or applying such an instrument is too 
cumbersome. For example arrest warrants are used in many cases, where other forms of 
71 On the problems when applying such a ground in Finnish and Swedish legislation, see Suominen 2014 pp. 
32-43, and more generally Asp 2014 pp. 8-9.  
72 Council decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the second 
generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), OJL 2007/205/63. 
73 See Gless 2011a pp. 3-5 and Öberg, EU criminal law, democratic legitimacy and judicial review of Union 
criminal law legislation in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, Tilburg Law Review 16 (2011) p. 63. 
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mutual legal assistance could be used, or pre-trial detention is used in many arrest war-
rant cases after the person is surrendered to the issuing state, where alternatives could 
have a similar effect.74 Today the arrest warrant is very effective and easy to use in situa-
tions where hearing the person initially through video-link or other alternatives might be 
enough. Similarly, in most cross-border cases, pre-trial detention is considered necessary 
as the suspected or accused person may be foreign, and therefore more prone to be at 
flight risk. Other alternatives to pre-trial detention are perhaps not always suitable for 
cross-border situations, which may also to some extent impact the use of pre-trial deten-
tion as in addition to being effective it is the easy solution.75
Not all aspects of EU criminal law cooperation are addressed at the EU level, and 
certain instruments have proven more effective than others. This is related to the im-
perfect EU criminal justice system in which all parts are not yet developed, and which 
can result in the ‘misuse’ of current instruments. This will become better in the future, 
with some new instruments which enable more forms of cooperation, and EU criminal 
law becoming more encompassing and including more aspects of cooperation in crim-
inal matters improving this. Already today, if we look at the three framework decisions 
concerning transfer of prisoners, probation and alternative sanctions and the European 
supervision order (mentioned above), this can be seen as improved. These instruments 
address different aspects of cooperation, where improvements and alternatives come into 
play. These instruments should together with the EAW lead to more functional coop-
eration legislation within the area of freedom, security and justice where more options 
are available. These instruments have however not yet been properly implemented by all 
Member States, and the practical use of them is therefore yet to be seen.76 
It is nevertheless important that relevant instruments are used for their purpose, and 
that certain instruments are not overused due to their effectiveness. As regards the use of 
pre-trial detention, the answer is not simple.77 In addition to the question on whether the 
EU has competence to legislate on the matter (is this included under article 82(2) TFEU, 
74 Statistics on pre-trial detention is somewhat problematic, as the situation can change from day to day, see 
further chapter 6.3. This is partly also true for the EAW cases. See Maior, The principle of proportionality: 
alternative measures to the European arrest warrant, in Keijzer and can Sliedregt (eds), The European arrest 
warrant in practice (Asser Press 2009) pp. 214-216. 
75 See further the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the imple-
mentation by the Member States of the Framework Decisions 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/
JHA on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions on custodial sentences or measures involving depriva-
tion of liberty, on probation decisions and alternative sanctions and on supervision measures as an alterna-
tive to provisional detention, COM(2014) 57 final, 5.2.2014. 
76 Ibid. on the implementation status. 
77 The Green paper has already been mentioned, and it is of course very interesting. It does however not solve 
all relevant questions, and for more information on it, see Report Detained without trial: Fair Trials Inter-
national’s response to the European Commission’s Green Paper on detention, October 2011 (available on 
http://www.fairtrials.org/documents/DetentionWithoutTrialFullReport.pdf, last visited 19.2.2014). 
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and is this related to mutual recognition?), the question is what form of instrument best 
would address the problems here. Alternatives to pre-trial detention, harmonisation of 
the conditions, more monitoring of such, or making sure that the suspect or accused 
person being foreign not automatically leads to the use of pre-trial detention and focus 
on rehabilitation are only a few examples of possibilities.78
There should be an option to assess the arrest warrant to avoid using it in situations 
where more lenient measures could be used, but the arrest warrant is chosen due to its 
effectiveness. It should be possible to apply arrest warrants respecting legal certainty, in-
cluding after the person has been surrendered, and the balance of the system within the 
area of freedom, security and justice should be preserved. The whole system of overuse 
of efficient crime combatting instruments when strictly not necessary should be more 
balanced overall within the area of freedom, security and justice. Regardless of how the 
mutual recognition system is construed, it should in any case not result in no Member 
State’s taking responsibility for human rights or other aspects of legal certainty in these 
cross-border cooperation situations.79
6.3 Minimum procedural rights
The minimum procedural rights for the suspect or the accused are another good ex-
ample of current EU criminal law focus. Minimum standards for suspects’ or accused 
persons’ procedural rights are considered essential for compensating for the possible dis-
advantages resulting from cross border criminal proceedings, such as not understanding 
the language of the court proceedings, the different rules on coercive measures or the 
mere reality of standing in court in another Member State, with all its disadvantages. 
One might consider the minimum rights guaranteed by the ECHR as being somewhat 
standard minimum rights within Europe. The EU has nevertheless considered that co-
operation in criminal matters between the Member States goes further than under the 
Council of Europe, and due to the possibly problematic situations the suspects can en-
counter, common minimum standards are necessary. This seems logical also when taking 
mutual recognition into account, as it imposes rather far-reaching cooperation duties on 
the judicial authorities of the Member States as well as the ECHR and the CFREU not per 
se regulating fundamental rights in cross-border situations. 
78 It is not possible to further elaborate on these matters in this context, but see these publications based on 
IRCP studies, Vermeulen et al. Cross-border Execution of Judgements Involving Deprivation of Liberty in 
the EU: Overcoming Legal and Practical Problems Through Flanking Measures (IRCP Series, Vol. 40 Maklu 
Publishers 2011) and Vermeulen et al. Material Detention Conditions, Execution of Custodial Sentences and 
Prisoner Transfer in the EU Member States (IRCP Series, Vol. 41 Maklu Publishers 2011). 
79 See CJEU case C-396/11 Radu, and slightly differently case C-399/11 Melloni although the latter was on 
the specific issue of judgments in absentia, also Thunberg-Schunke, Whose responsibility? A study of trans-
national defence rights and mutual recognition of judicial decisions within the EU (Intersentia 2013) pp. 5-6 
and 123-134 and Marguery, European Union fundamental rights and Member States action in EU criminal 
law, 20 MJ 2 (2013) p. 298. 
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As mentioned above, the roadmap presents some procedural rights that the EU is 
focusing on. Some of these are already regulated through directives, and these concern 
translation and interpretation and information on rights and charges. There is further-
more a proposal for a directive on the access to a lawyer and a green paper on pre-trial 
detention. The directives adopted (although not yet implemented), are positive improve-
ments for the suspect, but perhaps do not solve all nor the bigger problems in relation to 
deficits in European criminal proceedings.80 
Despite these being positive examples of current EU legislation, there are some draw-
backs as well. For example, in the directive on the right to information in criminal pro-
ceedings, it is clear that the list of rights to which the suspected person is entitled in 
article 3(1) is incomplete, since the right to be heard and the right to effective defence, 
among others, are not included. Although the article regulates which procedural rights 
at least should be guaranteed, there is no logical explanation for why some are left out 
of the list. The fact that article 4(2) of the directive adds some additional rights does not 
succour this, as these rights are not listed here either. It is unclear if the ambition has been 
to include all relevant rights (based on the ECHR), and if so, why some have been left out. 
Furthermore is the time limit in article 6 of the same directive not optimal with regard 
to the person being informed of the charges. Although the fairness of the proceedings, 
effective defence and that the information is to be given promptly is focused on in the 
article, this article does not further specify when the information is to be given, but states 
that this should take place ‘at the latest on submission of the merits of the accusation to a 
court’ (article 6(3)). This might be too late for an effective defence.  
In the directive on the right to interpretation, again the right to interpretation and 
translation in article 1 is not optimally regulated, as it actualises when the person is made 
aware that he is suspected or accused, and this in some cases can be too late in relation 
to having an effective defence. The list of essential documents that the person has a right 
to have translated, seems somewhat arbitrary in article 3 (1-4) as these are not further 
specified, but all ‘documents which are essential to ensure that they are able to exercise 
their right of defence and to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings’ are included. There 
are further restrictions, which do not seem very logical, and in article 3(7), there is an 
option to give an oral translation or summary in some circumstances. The fact that the 
conditions under which this is possible are not predefined can be problematic because 
there is no indication of how extensive such an oral translation or summary should be. 
It is difficult to see how an oral translation, or a summary could be beneficial for the sus-
pected, or in which cases such a translation could be sufficient. 
80 Critically on the roadmap, see Smith, Running before we can walk? Mutual recognition at the expense of 
fair trials in Europe’s area of freedom, security and justice, NJECL, vol. 4 1-2/2013 pp. 91-95, and pp. 95-98 
on pre-trial detention, which cannot unfortunately be focused on more here. See also the new Communi-
cation COM(2014) 144 final, 11.3.2014 pp. 3 and 6-7. 
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On a more general level, it can be questioned whether it is reasonable for the EU legis-
lator to legislate minimum procedural rights with a one-by-one approach, and if so, what 
the scope of such instruments should be. According to the above-mentioned roadmap, 
the one-by-one approach is the prevailing, and the current directives are usually narrow 
in scope.81 The added value compared with the ECHR is not very visible as such, as the 
minimum rights guaranteed usually are not much higher than the already existing level 
of protection. Although the symbolic nature of such instruments might add something, it 
seems bizarre that the EU cannot agree on a higher protection than the ECHR. The direc-
tives seem to guarantee a low protection for the individual, which might lead to a ‘race to 
the bottom’, entailing that cooperation is ‘easier’ when all Member States apply the same 
low standards for minimum procedural rights. This is in no way a desirable development. 
Legislating on minimum procedural rights should not lessen the impact of legal certainty 
within the area of freedom, security and justice, but quite the contrary. 
There are, of course, positive examples to be found in the directives as well. First of all 
both directives, in the respective provisions under article 1, explicitly refer to the EAW, 
which is positive, as it has been noted that the EAW creates some lacunas and that EU 
action for this is necessary. It is imperative that legal certainty be enhanced in relation to 
the even more efficient use of mutual recognition in EAWs. The right to judicial review 
on a decision concerning refusal of access to some material in the directive on the right 
to information, article 7(4) is furthermore a positive example in relation to legal certainty. 
Another positive note is that the Commission recently issued a communication 
on making progress on procedural safeguards for suspected and accused persons and 
strengthening the foundation of the European area of criminal justice.82 Here the Com-
mission states that it wants more procedural rights for citizens in criminal proceedings 
and in relation to this presented five proposals.83 The proposals, which are from late 2013, 
consist of three proposals for directives concern the presumption of innocence and to be 
present at trial,84 special safeguards for children when suspected or accused of a crime85 
81 The EU is aware of this and is currently considering codifying these, see Communication COM(2014) 144, 
final, 11.3.2014 p. 8. 
82 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council the European economic 
and social committee and the committee of the regions. Making progress on the European Union Agenda 
on Procedural Safeguards for Suspects or Accused Persons - Strengthening the Foundation of the European 
Area of Criminal Justice, COM(2013) 820 final, Brussels 27.11.2013.
83 See the press release of 27.11.2013 at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1157_en.htm (last visited 
11.03.2014). 
84 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the strengthening of certain aspects 
of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings, COM(2013) 
821 final, Brussels, 27.11.2013, 2013/0407 (COD). There is an impact assessment accompanying the pro-
posal, SWD(2013) 478 final, 27.11.2013. 
85 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on procedural safeguards for chil-
dren suspected or accused in criminal proceedings, COM(2013) 822 final, Brussels, 27.11.2013, 2013/0408 
(COD). Also accompanied by an impact assessment, SWD(2013) 480 final, 27.11.2013. 
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and legal aid.86 These are complemented by two recommendations, which concern pro-
cedural rights for vulnerable people87 and the right to legal aid.88 
The proposals concern important aspects of legal certainty and are positive initiatives 
towards a more balanced area of freedom, security and justice. Legal certainty is priori-
tised and the current deficits in the balance of EU criminal law are focused on. Especially 
the presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle of the Member States’ criminal 
law systems, which the Stockholm programme mentioned as a tool to promote cooper-
ation.89 The presumption of innocence can further be considered important for mutual 
trust between the Member States, as it a fundamental principle also enshrined in the case 
law of the ECtHR.90
6.4 The rights of the victim 
The rights of the victim in cross-border criminal proceedings have been actively discussed 
in the EU, concerning amongst other how the victim should be protected, which rights 
and role he should have and how far these should be extended, especially in a European 
proceeding.91 What makes this especially interesting within the area of freedom, security 
and justice is the addition of the victim into the equation of the state and the suspected or 
accused person as actors. This raises additional fundamental questions on how the crim-
inal procedure should be and what its ultimate aim is.92 Depending on how legal certainty 
is defined, the rights of the victim can be either included in this, or excluded. Taking into 
account that within the area of freedom, security and justice, the EU shall guarantee the 
rights of the victim, these rights are here considered as part of legal certainty.  
86 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, on provisional legal aid for suspects 
or accused persons deprived of liberty and legal aid in European arrest warrant proceedings, COM(2013) 
824 final, Brussels, 27.11.2013, 2013/0409 (COD). Also accompanied by an impact assessment, SWD(2013) 
476 final, 27.11.2013. 
87 Commission recommendation of 27 November 2013 on procedural safeguards for vulnerable persons sus-
pected or accused in criminal proceedings (2013/C 378/02). 
88 Commission recommendation of 27 November 2013 on the right to legal aid for suspects or accused per-
sons in criminal proceedings (2013/C 378/03). 
89 Stockholm programme p. 10. 
90 On the case law of the ECtHR see e.g. cases Allen v. The United Kingdom, appl. nr. 25424/09, 12.7.2013, 
Yassar Hussain v. The United Kingdom, appl. nr. 8866/04, 7.6.2006, Minelli v. Switzerland, appl. nr. 8660/79, 
25.3.1983 and Ringvold v. Norway, appl. nr. 34964/97, 11.2.2003. For more information on the presumption 
of innocence, see Duff, Who must be presume whom to be innocent of what? Netherlands Journal of Legal 
Philosophy 2013 (42) 3 pp. 170-192, Ulväng, Presumption of innocence versus a principle of fairness, Neth-
erlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 2013 (42) 3 pp. 205-224 and Frände, The presumption of innocence and 
the Finnish Law of Evidence, Festschrift für Helmut Fuchs (Verlag Österreich 2014) pp. 163-169. 
91 See also Letschert and Rijken, Rights of victims of crime: tension between an integrated approach and a 
limited legal basis for harmonisation, NJECL vol. 4, 3/2013 pp. 227-233. 
92 Similarly Mitsilegas, Security versus justice The individualisation of security and the erosion of citizenship 
and fundamental rights, in Justice and Security in the 21st Century 2012 pp. 206-207. 
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Wieczorek has, based on victimology and the categories in the Commission proposal, 
listed six needs of victims. These are the need of respect and recognition, the need for 
participation, the need for information, the need for protection, the need of support and 
the need of reparation.93 She points out that the needs are not fully reconcilable with 
each other, and that these are challenging especially in a cross-border criminal proceed-
ing. Cross-border victims have special needs, and these are not necessarily similar to 
the needs of national victims, such as the need for interpretation and translation, and 
plans for avoiding the risk of secondary victimisation.94 This shows that protecting the 
victim within the area of freedom, security and justice is not a simple task and specific 
attention should be given to this. As European proceedings based on mutual recognition 
might lead to the victim’s rights not being recognised or them not having any rights in 
cross-border situations, it is positive that the EU is addressing this matter.
This was noted already in 2001, as there is a framework decision on the rights of the 
victims from that year, but this framework decision never gained much practical use be-
tween the Member States.95 The Stockholm programme emphasised the rights of victims 
of crime and in article 82(2) TFEU, the rights of the victim are mentioned as one relevant 
area for EU legislation, as long as measures only concern minimum harmonisation and 
these are necessary for facilitating mutual recognition.96 The position of the victim in a 
European setting has politically risen, as can be seen by the Council resolution on a road-
map for strengthening the rights and protection of victims, in particular in criminal pro-
ceedings.97 As the framework decision was not successful, it is being replaced by a direc-
tive on minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime.98 
The directive on minimum rights has as its main purpose to ‘ensure that victims of 
crime receive appropriate information, support and protection and are able to partici-
pate in criminal proceedings’.99 It is divided into three main parts, including a part on 
information and support, a part on participation in criminal proceedings and a part on 
93 Wieczorek 2012 pp. 144-145. 
94 Ibid. p. 147. 
95 Council framework decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal pro-
ceedings, OJ L 82/1, 22.3.2001 and implementation reports Report from the Commission on the basis of 
Article 18 of the Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal 
proceedings COM(2004)54 final/2, 16.02.2004 and Report from the Commission pursuant to Article 18 
of the Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings 
(2001/220/JHA) COM(2009) 166 final, 20.4.2009. 
96 See further Letschert and Rijken 2013 pp. 234-235 on this competence. 
97 Resolution of the Council of 10 June 2011 on a Roadmap for strengthening the rights and protection of 
victims, in particular in criminal proceeding, OJ C 187/1, 28.6.2011. 
98 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing min-
imum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Frame-
work Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315/57, 14.11.2012.
99 Art. 1(1) of the directive. 
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protection of the victims. The directive includes many of the rights that were included in 
the framework decision, such as the right to be heard and to give evidence,100 the reim-
bursement of expenses,101 the right to receive information102 and the right to legal aid.103 
The directive introduces certain improvements, which the framework decision did not 
cover. These are the right to translation and interpretation,104 the right to be informed of 
available procedures for making a complaint, if their rights are not respected,105 the right 
to receive written acknowledgment when making a complaint106 and the possibility to 
demand a review of a decision not to prosecute.107 There is further a provision regarding 
vulnerable victims, for those in need of specific protection.108
Taking into account that the rights regulated are not always automatic in cross-border 
situations, the directive is a welcome improvement for the rights of victims. Its focus can 
be characterised as ensuring victims broad participation rights and that the protection of 
victims is focused on.109 
Another example increasing legal certainty for victims is the European protection 
order.110 As a starting point, national protection orders only apply within the national 
jurisdiction. This instrument applies mutual recognition to protection orders, which are 
decisions imposing prohibitions or restrictions on persons representing a danger to other 
persons (these can be considered a form of restraining order). The idea is free movement 
of decisions concerning protection measures for victims of crime between the Member 
States. The recognition of the protection order applies throughout the area of freedom, 
security and justice and extending mutual recognition to this aspect of criminal proce-
dure is welcome, as previously decisions on protective measures have not had a Union 
wide effect. Applying protection orders only nationally can be problematic when Union 
citizens use their right of free movement.111 
A European protection order can only be issued based on protection order in the is-
suing state, and can impose one of the three alternatives on a person causing danger: ‘(a) 
a prohibition from entering certain localities, places or defined areas where the protect-
100 Art. 10 of the directive and art. 3 of the preceding framework decision. 
101 Art. 14 of the directive and art. 7 of the preceding framework decision. 
102 Art. 4 of the directive and art. 4 of the preceding framework decision. 
103 Art. 13 of the directive and art. 4(1)(f)(iii) of the preceding framework decision. 
104 Art. 7 of the directive. 
105 Art. 4(1)(h) of the directive. 
106 Art. 5 of the directive. 
107 Art. 11 of the directive. 
108 Art. 22 of the directive. 
109 Similarly Wieczorek 2012 pp. 154-156, see also Letschert and Rijken 2013 pp. 245-247. 
110 Directive 2011/99/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the Euro-
pean protection order, OJ L 338/2, 21.12.2011. 
111 Also pointed out in recital 5 of the preamble of the directive. 
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ed person resides or visits; (b) a prohibition or regulation of contact, in any form, with 
the protected person, including by phone, electronic or ordinary mail, fax or any other 
means; or (c) a prohibition or regulation on approaching the protected person closer 
than a prescribed distance.’112 A European protection order is to be used when the pro-
tected person decides to reside or stay in another Member State, or already resides or 
stays there.113 There are, as in all mutual recognition instruments, certain grounds for 
refusal, which include the requirement of double criminality, statute-barred offences, ne 
bis in idem, immunity or amnesty and jurisdictional issues.114 The European protection 
order further contains rules on the discontinuance of measures based on an order, such 
as the maximum duration of the measure expiring, or the person no longer residing or 
staying in the other Member State.115 The protection order resembles many of the other 
mutual recognition instruments and can be considered a positive measure enhancing the 
protection of victims of crime, and through this, legal certainty within the Union. 
Focus on the rights of the victims has previously not been such an essential part of the 
area of freedom, security and justice. The improvements in this field are positive. Both di-
rectives, the one on the victims’ rights in criminal proceedings and the one on the Euro-
pean protection order are adopted, but not yet implemented (the deadline is late 2015). It 
will be interesting to see how these will function in practice. If the provisions are followed 
correctly in the national setting, the legal certainty as regards victims’ rights is increased. 
6.5 The possible EPPO
A proposal for a European public prosecutor’s office (EPPO) is reality today. The Com-
mission has, again, proposed that the EPPO be set up for the effective protection of the 
financial interest of the EU.116 Based on a fairly long road resulting in the proposal main-
112 Art. 5 of the directive. 
113 Art. 6 of the directive. 
114 Art. 10 of the directive. For a more general overview of grounds for refusal in mutual recognition instru-
ment, see Suominen 2011 pp. 111-277.  
115 Art. 14 of the directive. 
116 Proposal for a Council regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, 
COM(2013) 534 final, 17.7.2013. For the previous attempts, see the Green paper on criminal-law protection 
of the financial interests of the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor, COM(2001) 
715 final, 11.12.2001, Delmas-Marty (ed.) Corpus Juris: Introducing Penal Provisions for the Purpose of 
the Financial Interests of the European Union, (Economica 1997), Delmas-Marty and Vervaele (eds.) The 
Implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member States: Penal Provisions for the Protection of European 
Finances, 4 Volumes (Intersentia 2000), and the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions 
on the protection of the financial interests of the European Union by criminal law and by administrative 
investigation, COM(2011) 293 final, 26.5.2011. OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office) is also relevant in this 
respect, see the Commission decision of 27 September 2013 amending Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Eur-
atom establishing the European Anti-fraud Office, OJ L 257/19, 28.9.2013. See also Zwiers, The European 
public prosecutor’s office, analysis of a multilevel criminal justice system (Intersentia 2011). 
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taining the main competences at the Member State level, this proposal is interesting from 
many angles and many different aspects in relation to legal certainty. Adding yet another 
strong focus point on the prosecutorial side in EU criminal law poses many potential 
problems for legal certainty, such as lack of equality of arms and especially in relation to 
applicable jurisdiction, which procedural safeguards apply. It is not possible to go into all 
aspects of the proposal that might be relevant from a legal certainty point of view here. 
In this article, the chapters on procedural safeguards (IV) and judicial review (V) are of 
interest. These will be analysed from a legal certainty perspective. 
As for procedural safeguards, the proposal firstly lists the rights that the suspected or 
accused person is to have.117 These mainly correlate with the applicable directives in EU 
criminal law today118 and the person shall have these rights from the time that they are 
suspected of having committed an offence.119 The proposal does not further elaborate 
when this takes place. The proposal further states that suspected and accused persons 
shall have all procedural rights available under applicable national law.120 The proposal 
secondly focuses on the right to remain silent and the presumption of innocence. The 
right to remain silent shall apply in accordance with national law when the suspect or 
accused person is questioned,121 and the person is to be assumed innocent until proven 
guilty according to national law.122 Thirdly, the proposal contains a provision on the right 
to legal aid. The suspected or accused person shall, again in accordance with national law, 
have a possibility to legal assistance free or partially free of charge, if he cannot pay for 
it himself.123 Fourthly, the proposal has a provision on evidence, stating that the suspect 
or accused shall have the possibility in accordance with national law to present evidence 
to the consideration of the EPPO.124 It continues stating that the suspected or accused 
person shall have the right to request the EPPO to gather evidence relevant for the inves-
tigation, and this is again to be done in accordance with national law.125
These are not a complete overview of the possibly necessary procedural safeguards or 
legal certainty safeguards within the EU today, but are those considered of importance 
for the functioning of the EPPO. The same critique as in relation to the minimum proce-
dural rights in chapter 6.3 can of course be said to apply here; the rights guaranteed are 
narrow in scope and the added value is sometimes hard to grasp. At the same time, the 
117 Art.32 of the proposal. 
118 Art. 32(2) points a-f of the proposal.
119 Art. 32(3) of the proposal. 
120 Art. 32(5) of the proposal. 
121 Art. 33(1) of the proposal.
122 Art. 33(2) of the proposal. 
123 Art. 34 of the proposal. 
124 Art. 35(1) of the proposal. 
125 Art. 35(2) of the proposal. 
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EPPO proposal does not as such create any rights in relation to procedural safeguards, 
but only lists the relevant EU instruments regulating these, or relies on the national law. 
No rights are as such introduced however, would the national law not have such rights 
available. This is interesting, as there seems to be no enhancement of the rights of the 
individual or legal certainty in this respect, whereas the EPPO enhances the possibilities 
of the prosecutorial side. The lack of balance in EU criminal procedural law has already 
previously been criticised.126 
In the EU setting, the balance can prove to be even more interesting, if the criminal 
justice system for some parts becomes European, in the meaning of ‘supranational crimi-
nal law’. At the moment, all actors are still national, the police, prosecutors and the courts. 
There is no EU court with competence to sentence individuals to criminal responsibility 
or to judicially review such national decisions (the ECHR is not considered here). The 
same will apply also when EU criminal law is directly enforced.127 The EPPO proposal 
does not seem to alter this, as the proposed EPPO would to a large extent maintain the 
competence at a national level. 
This is further seen in the provision regulating judicial review of procedural measures 
of the EPPO. Article (36(1)) of the proposal states that 
[when] adopting procedural measures in the performance of its functions, the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office shall be considered as a national authority for the purpose of judicial review.
This is interesting from many angles. It emphasises that the primary competence still 
will be national, or at least semi-national. The prosecutorial competence of the EPPO 
will have some sort of semi-supranational form, mainly still within the Member States’ 
competence but having some increased efficiency which adds some European features. 
Notwithstanding, the decisions made by the EPPO are to be considered national ones, 
and the judicial review of such decisions will still only be national. It would perhaps seem 
more logical if the CJEU would be competent for the judicial review of the procedural 
measures of the EPPO in the sense that there is a European dimension in deciding those 
measures. Especially for issues concerning deciding on the ancillary competence, the 
applicable jurisdiction or certain investigation measures, the CJEU would seem more 
legitimate to decide on judicial review of such decisions.128 
Taking into account the reluctance of the Member States to give further competences 
to the EU, this might seem logical, but how this will be dealt with in practice and what it 
results in for the individual is to be seen. The prosecutorial side has been strengthened 
126 Chapter 5 above and Asp et al. A manifesto on European Criminal Procedure Law, ZIS 11/2013 pp. 430-466 
and on a possible Eurodefensor, Schünemann (ed.) Gesamtkonzept für die Europäische Strafrechtspflege, A 
programme for European criminal justice (Carl Heymanns Verlag 2006) pp. 301-307. 
127 See further arts. 256-281 TFEU on the competence of the CJEU. 
128 See arts. 13, 14 and 26 of the proposal. 
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • 1/2014
29
but it can be argued that no additional safeguards or powers have been granted to the 
defence side. This is perhaps not surprising, but less desirable from a legal certainty per-
spective. If the courts of the Member States are equipped for this task and the legal cer-
tainty of the individuals will not suffer from labelling the EPPO as national in this sense, 
then of course this would not be problematic. If this focus leads to an unbalanced process 
to the detriment of the defence, this becomes more problematic. For the realisation of the 
EPPO, it is difficult to say how this will function or when it will function. 
It is interesting to note that the model rules for the EPPO suggest that there should 
be a possibility to review the legality of the measures of the EPPO by the CJEU.129 The 
model rules reach further in many other aspects, such as the competences of the EPPO, 
where the model rules foresee a more supranational character of the EPPO and where the 
safeguards relevant for legal certainty are somewhat further elaborated on.130 
7 Conclusion 
This article has shown that legal certainty within the area of freedom, security and justice 
encompasses many different aspects. Common for these is today that the focus has some-
what shifted to putting the individual in the centre. This is positive, but at the same time it 
can be concluded that legal certainty and especially the rights of the individual still need 
to be focused on. Legal certainty should have a stronger role within the area, and there 
are many issues to resolve for this to take place. Instruments focusing on legal certainty 
being initiated later than the respective repressive ones, the overall focus on effective 
crime combatting and the sometimes ad hoc nature of EU criminal law all influence the 
role of legal certainty. 
Mutual recognition and cooperation generally is state driven and has state interests as 
a main focus. Newer instruments and areas have a slightly lesser state interest, but mutu-
al recognition should nevertheless not in any case undermine the protection of human 
rights nor should it lead to Member States avoiding responsibility for fundamental hu-
man rights. Mutual recognition should not enable Member States to misuse instruments 
and rely on effectiveness to the detriment of the suspected or accused person. Measures 
increasing minimum procedural rights or the rights of victims are good examples of this. 
The EU should strive for a higher protection of minimum procedural rights and through 
this for a higher protection of legal certainty. This should by no means result in adoption 
of a lower standard than before, nor accepting lower standards than what a Union today 
should strive for. This applies for the rights of the victim, which need to be taken seri-
129 Rule 7 (judicial control) of the model rules for the procedure of the EPPO, available on the webpage of the 
project: http://www.eppo-project.eu/ (last visited 19.2.2014) and see also Ligeti (ed.), Towards a prosecutor 
for the European Union (vol. 1, Hart Publishing 2013). 
130 Rule 1 (status and competence) of the model rules as well as rules 8 to 19 under chapter 2 of the model 
rules, regulating general rules on procedural safeguards and evidence.  
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ously in a European perspective and especially in situations resulting from cross-border 
proceedings. 
The proposal on the EPPO shows that emphasis is still on the effectiveness of crime 
combatting and from the mutual recognition and harmonisation instruments it can be 
concluded that these do not today represent a coherent system at the EU level. Legal 
certainty and equality of arms should be two of the main focuses of the EPPO, and this 
institution should not further emphasise only effective crime combating. Effective pro-
tection of the financial interests of the EU is important, but the balance of the system 
should be kept in mind. These examples show the complexity of EU criminal law and the 
importance of safeguarding legal certainty aspects in all of these areas. 
The Commission has recently issued a communication on a new EU framework to 
strengthen the rule of law.131 The Commission has defined the principles expressing the 
core meaning of the rule of law as common values of the EU as: 
Those principles include legality, which implies a transparent, accountable, democratic and plural-
istic process for enacting laws; legal certainty; prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; 
independent and impartial courts; effective judicial review including respect for fundamental 
rights; and equality before the law…132
This definition of the rule of law is very similar to the one of legal certainty used in this 
article. Some positive development could be seen already earlier, but focus as of March 
2014 seems to be even more on legal certainty, or the rule of law, as the Commission la-
bels this. The Commission continues by stating that ‘[t]his means that respect for the rule 
of law is intrinsically linked to respect for democracy and for fundamental rights: there 
can be no democracy and respect for fundamental rights without respect for the rule of 
law and vice versa. Fundamental rights are effective only if they are justiciable’.133 What 
the Commission proposes, in brief, is a new framework for the rule of law, which main 
purpose is to address threats to the rule of law. These are to be of a systemic nature and 
this new framework is to be added to the existing EU procedures available within Union 
law today.134  
This is interesting and an up-to-date reaction by the Commission. This seems positive 
for legal certainty and its role becoming more fundamental within the area of freedom, 
security and justice, which is well motivated. Legal certainty should be better prioritised 
131 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council A new EU Framework 
to strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014) 158 final, 11.3.2014. 
132 COM(2014) 158 final p. 4, emphasis included in the original text. 
133 Ibid. p. 4. 
134 These are the infringement procedure in art. 258 TFEU and the preventive and sanctioning mechanisms in 
art. 7 TEU. See also the Annexes to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014) 158 final, annexes 1 and 
2, 11.3.2014. 
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within the area of freedom, security and justice and the whole area should be more bal-
anced. The focus on the new framework for the rule of law adds an impetus for a better 
future in this respect. Peers has however commented on this communication and al-
though being relatively positive, also stated that ‘there are no specific overriding themes 
that would bring together the EU’s future JHA plans into a coherent system’.135 The lack 
of coherence in the system can obviously impact negatively on legal certainty within the 
area of freedom, security and justice, and only the future can show us which position 
legal certainty gains.
135 Peers, Analysis The next multi-year EU Justice and Home Affairs programme, Views of the Commission 
and the Member States of 12.3.2014, available at http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-238-new-jha-pro-
gramme.pdf (last visited 13.3.2014). 
